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RESISTANCE, TO RIGHTEOUS RESISTANCE:




On this fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education,' arriving
on the heels of the recent University of Michigan affirmative action
cases,2 I propose taking an "extra-doctrinal" moment to contemplate
how the cultural politics of race have likely shaped dominant legal
framings regarding society's regulation of access to quality education.
This Essay seeks to explain affirmative action jurisprudence as a dis-
tinctly cultural phenomenon. My hope is that such a framing will
underscore the need for more effective, proactive strategies and
broad-based coalitions of diversity advocates. I believe that only such
strategies and coalitions can achieve social justice objectives gener-
ally, and increase the representation of people of color specifically in
university admissions and employment.
Although civil rights advocates and critical race theorists hail the
Grutter decision as a legal victory for affirmative action and diversity,
Grutter is at best a "split decision." The case is most important not as
legal doctrine, but rather in its meaning for the cultural politics of
race and educational access.3 Justice O'Connor's opinion upholds
Professor, DePaul University College of Law. I would like to thank Luke Charles Harris,
Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Paulette Caldwell, and Derrick Bell for their support and encouragement
in this endeavor. I am indebted to Gil Gott for his superb editorial comments, and to my re-
search assistant, Rima Kapitan, for her dedicated research assistance. Portions of this Essay
were presented at a forum organized by the Latino Law Students Association during Diversity
Week at Northwestern University (Spring 2003), a symposium on the black middle class organ-
ized by the Black Law Students' Association at New York University (February 2004), the Af-
firmative Action Summit at Columbia University (March 2004), and the symposium on race ju-
risprudence and the Supreme Court organized by the University of Pennsylvania Journal of
Constitutional Law (February 2004). It was a particular pleasure to work and interact with the
skilled Journal editors, and Alicia Novak in particular. This research was supported by a grant
from DePaul University College of Law.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ("Brown 1").
2 Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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"diversity" and the search for a "critical mass" as a suitable basis for
finding a compelling state interest,4 while at the same time continu-
ing the doctrinal denouement that began in Regents of the University of
California v. Bakke': affirmative action is ultimately dangerous and
subject to judicial containment and, eventually, elimination-the
opinion's twenty-five-year sunset provision.6 Most tellingly, the Court
unanimously disqualified the pursuit of "racial balance" in higher
education as a sufficiently compelling state interest and declared such
an objective to be "patently unconstitutional."' Thus, rather than ac-
cepting Grutter as a "win," affirmative action proponents must under-
stand that a concerted, cultural campaign will be necessary to main-
tain diversity policies in higher education, for the near term as well as
twenty-five years from now and beyond.
Affirmative action supporters should not lose sight of the ways in
which law interacts with a broader cultural apparatus of race that
works like the [somewhat] invisible hand of affirmative action doc-
trine. It may seem a bit sacrilegious to propose that civil rights advo-
cates, and lawyers generally, may have taken the law too seriously (es-
pecially on constitutional matters having to do with race) at a
symposium on constitutional law. While litigation is necessary, I be-
lieve its impact on Supreme Court decision making and legal doc-
trine is less significant than its impact on the culture that will "en-
force" and "enact" the law.
(upholding the Law School's objective of a "critical mass" of diverse student body as an accept-
able compelling state interest), with Gratz, 539 U.S. 244 (2003) (striking an undergraduate af-
firmative action program that utilized a "point system" for race, among other factors, as not
comporting with "narrow tailoring" requisites of strict scrutiny review). However, I view the
Grutter case itself to represent a split decision for reasons elaborated below.
4 Critical race scholars may acknowledge the Court's "interest convergence" on permitting
diversity to serve a compelling state interest; that is, that the benefit of affirmative action to
people of color converges with the state's interest in developing a multiracial corporate and
military elite. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329-30.
5 438 U.S. 265, 299 (1978) (declaring that governmental classifications that "touch upon an
individual's race or ethnic background entitles petitioner to a judicial determination that ques-
tions if the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest"); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995)
(concluding that "[m]ore than good motives should be required when government seeks to
allocate its resources by way of an explicit racial classification system").
6 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
7 Id. at 329-30 (acknowledging that the Law School did not seek to ensure "some specified
percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or ethnic origin" because to do so
"would amount to outright racial balancing, which is patently unconstitutional"). O'Connor's
majority opinion in Grutteris consistent with Justice Powell's determination in Bakke that "reduc-
ing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in medical schools" represents "an
unlawful [state] interest in racial balancing." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at
306-07). For a compelling elaboration of this point, see Girardeau A. Spann, Neutralizing Grut-
ter, 7 U. PA.J. CONsT. L. 633 (2005).
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I, of course, do not mean to suggest a strict "law/culture" opposi-
tion. Legal doctrine and political culture are inter-imbricated and, at
times, mutually reinforcing, as I discuss below. Indeed, this synthetic
understanding of the relationship between law and culture simply
seeks to re-establish culture as a significant terrain of contestation
that seems to fall by the wayside in the heat of affirmative action liti-
gation battles. In this sense, I seek to correct the overly-positivist be-
lief that law is foundational in the establishment and expansion of
"rights" (a belief held explicitly or implicitly by many litigators and
civil rights leaders). This belief itself was forged in reaction to the re-
gressive "stateways cannot change folkways" laissez-faire formulation
regarding the natural dominance of culture over law that was effec-
tively deployed by southern intellectuals to defeat post-reconstruction
civil rights legislation and constitutional protections of the First Re-
construction.
In developing this argument, I will examine the "culture wars"
that have raged around access for communities of color to quality
education. I will first discuss the cultural response, known as "massive
resistance," to the Brown decision. I will then contrast this with what I
call "passive resistance" to the Bakke decision. Finally, I will conclude
with a call for "righteous resistance" to the Gratz and Grutter decisions,
and consider specific ways that advocates of affirmative action may
more proactively shape a culture of resistance to retrenchment on ra-
cial justice that will measure its effectiveness not only by partial victo-
ries in court, but also by success in the court of public opinion.
I. THE CULTURE WARS FROM BROWNTO BAKKE
A. Massive Resistance and the Lesson from Brown:
A Racialized "Call-and-Response"
The 1954 Brown v. Board of Education decision ("Brown f') is popu-
larly understood as the watershed case in which a unanimous Su-
preme Court invalidated segregated schools as a violation of constitu-
See WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPACT OF
USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS (1907), cited in RICHARD HOFSTADTER,
SOCIAL DARWINISM IN AMERICAN THOUGHT 37-51 (Beacon Press 1992) (1944) (emphasizing
Sumner's belief that "folkways" were products of evolutionary growths and not artifacts of hu-
man purpose or wit); see also Roscoe Pound, The Limits of Effective Legal Action, 27 INT'LJ. ETHICS
150, 151 (1917) (arguing that legal mores are governed by deep-seated social mores and prac-
tices, and that law accordingly should codify, not modify, existing practices). I note the irony of
my argument's consistency with Sumnerian sociology. However, I distinguish myself by advocat-
ing for greater consideration of and coordination between the cultural apparatus that impacts
the law and the litigation strategies by affirmative action advocates rather than arguing for lais-
sez-faire constitutionalism.
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tional equal protection guarantees.9 Writing for the Court, newly-
installed Chief Justice Earl Warren identified the centrality of public
education to the Court's analysis, stating that "[i]n the field of public
education, the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place." ° Al-
though Brown I has been hailed as courageous and transformative, it
should be noted that the Court's position against segregation was
hardly counter-majoritarian. More than half of the American popula-
tion supported the Brown I decision when the Court handed it
down." Without the cultural opposition to the Jim Crow laws, it is
unclear whether the Court would have forged ahead to take a
counter-majoritarian position on such a polarizing issue. Justice
Frankfurter commented that he would have upheld school segrega-
tion a decade earlier as "public opinion had not then crystallized
against it."'
2
While Brown I was a clear victory for plaintiff-petitioners and the
NAACP, the Court refused to order an immediate remedy, and in-
stead postponed arguments for the implementation of Brown I until
the next term. In the subsequent decision,'3 decided in 1955, the
Court opted for an indeterminate and gradualist approach to deseg-
regation that subordinated implementation to "local conditions":
School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assess-
ing, and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the
action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the
governing constitutional principles. Because of their proximity to local
conditions and the possible need for further hearings, the courts which
originally heard these cases can best perform this judicial appraisal.
14
As for the timeline for desegregation, the Court rejected the plaintiff-
petitioners' proposed deadline of the fall of 1956, opting instead for
the indeterminate and contradictory standard of admitting plaintiffs
to public schools on a nondiscriminatory basis "with all deliberate
speed." 5
Legal scholars and commentators have observed how Brown II
represented a "solid victory for white southerners."' 6 "[B]y almost any
measure," one commentator declared, "it gave the South a great deal
more of what it had asked at the final round of arguments than it
9 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
10 Id.
11 MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIvIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 310 (2003).
12 Id.
13 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) ("Brown IF).
14 Id. at 299.
15 Id. at 301; see also KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 313 ("The U]ustices chose vagueness and
gradualism."); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLEJUSTICE 746 (1975).
16 KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 316.
[Vol. 7:3
UNDERSTANDING THE CULTURE WARS
gave to the Negro."'7 NAACP General Counsel and litigator in Brown,
Robert L. Carter, wryly observed that the "all deliberate speed" for-
mula represented "compliance on terms that the white South could
accept."
What Brown I giveth to civil rights activists, Brown H taketh away.
As legal historian Loren Miller observed, "[t]he harsh truth is that
the first Brown decision was a great decision; the second Brown deci-
sion was a great mistake."' 9 The Justices had hoped to strike a con-
ciliatory tone in Brown II that would spur compliance with Brown I-a
sort of "peace offering" that served as an "invitation to moderates to
meet them halfway."2  Brown II instead invited defiance and resis-
tance, if not open mockery of the Court's naivet6. As Professor Klar-
man detailed, "the same people who acknowledged the Court's con-
ciliatory gesture often emphasized their undiminished commitment
to preserving segregation":
A Florida segregationist thought the Court had "realized it made a mis-
take in May and is getting out of it the best way it can." A Texas legislator
declared that the "Court got hold of a hot potato and didn't know what
to do with it." A Virginia politician announced that "the court has not
the courage of its previously avowed convictions." Some southern ob-
servers believed that the threats of school closures and violence had in-
timidated the justices, and they deduced that further pressure might per-
suade the Court to abandon Brown altogether. Over the following
months, some white southerners predicted that patient determination on
their part would convince the Court and nation to abandon southern
22Blacks as they had during Reconstruction.
Segregationist culture constrained judicial decisionmaking in Brown
II, and that constraint reinforced a culture of open resistance to ra-
cial justice. "Perhaps the most the Justices could do," one scholar
noted, "was to say that segregation was wrong and then rely on the
best instincts of the American people to figure out how to eradicate
the practice.22
In short, the Court catered to the southern resistors' racist time-
line for when and how they would desegregate. Instead of fostering
compliance with the Brown I order to desegregate, Brown II promoted
resistance. This resistance took many forms throughout the years,
and effectively frustrated the Brown I order to provide quality educa-
17 KLUGER, supra note 15, at 745.
18 Robert Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 237, 243 (1968), cited
in DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM & AMERICAN LAw 167-68 n. 10 (5th ed. 2004).
19 LOREN MILLER, THE PETITIONERS: THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES AND THE NEGRO 351 (Pantheon Books 1966), cited in BELL, supra note 18, at 166 n.7.
20 KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 319.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 319-20.
23 KLUGER, supra note 15, at 746.
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24tion for students of color through integration. The impact of Brown
I should be remembered not for its lofty pronouncement that segre-
gation has no place in education, but for the racialized "call-and-
response" that the Court engaged in with southern segregationists in
crafting Brown I.
For example, in the five years immediately following the Brown
decision, southern resistors developed various strategies to subvert
desegregation 5 in the era of Massive Resistance or "absolute defi-
ance. '' 6 In the 1955 Briggs v. Elliot decision, Judge Parker of the East-
ern District of South Carolina innovated what came to be known as
the "Parker Doctrine." 7 He interpreted Brown to say that the Court
doesn't require integration, but merely forbids segregation, thereby
endorsing the status quo and requiring little from white school dis-
tricts.2" The Parker doctrine of judicial resistance inspired many
24 See, e.g., National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP"), Intro-
duction to the Court Opinion of Brown v. Board of Education Case (illustrating the resistance to the
Brown decision in its many forms), at http://www.naacp.org/departments/education/
brownindex.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2004).
25 See KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 321-43 (describing post-Brown judicial decisions in south-
ern courts that sought to undermine civil rights by upholding antimiscegenation laws and non-
anonymous jury selection decisions); see also KLUGER, supra note 15, at 748-78 (describing the
South's judicial and legislative response to the Brown decision); FRANCES WILHOIT, THE
POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 136-50 (1973) (describing the efficacious strategies of the
South's governors, attorneys general, state legislators, and councilmen in transforming Massive
Resistance into a counter-revolutionary policy). See generally NUMAN BARTLEY, THE RISE OF
MASSIVE RESISTANCE (1969) (framing the ultimate failure of the South's revolt against anti-
segregationist policies as the successful stabilization of southern political parties); CHARLES
OGLETREE, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED (2004) (chronicling the effect Brown's mixed message had
upon the southern resistance and civil rights attorneys and activists); JAMES T. PATTERSON,
BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A CIVIL RIGHTS MILESTONE AND ITS TROUBLED LEGACY 87
(2001) (describing the increased acts of white violence in response to desegregation as the "ul-
timate weapon in an arsenal that extremist southern whites wielded to preserve their suprem-
acy"); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE?
72-156 (1991) (attributing the lack of social change after the Brown Idecision to the Supreme
Court's lack of political and cultural support of civil rights).
26 J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, FROM BROWN TO BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL
INTEGRATION: 1954-1978, at 78 (1979). Wilkinson identified five stages to southern school de-
segregation post-Brown: (1) absolute defiance (i.e., massive resistance) from 1955 to 1959; (2)
token compliance from 1959 to 1964; (3) modest integration from 1964 to 1968; (4) massive
integration beginning in 1968 with Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 441 (1968) (hold-
ing that a school district's adoption of a "freedom-of-choice" plan to implement Brown Iwas un-
acceptable, concluding that the plan merely shifted the burden of desegregation from the
board to children and their parents); and (5) resegregation.
27 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
28 Id. (holding that the Supreme Court did not require the state to actually desegregate
schools, but to simply open the schools to children of all races, even though the children of dif-
ferent races attended different schools); see also KLUGER, supra note 15, at 751-52 ("This so-
called 'Parker doctrine' was widely seized upon by southern courts to approve a variety of ma-
neuvers designed to deflect the impact of Brown."); OGLETREE, supra note 25, at 130 (explaining
how Briggs gave the states a clue on how to maintain segregation: different races could volun-
tarily attend different schools,just as they chose different churches); WILHOIT, supra note 25, at
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other southern judges and courts to defy Brown.29 Perhaps this analy-
sis was not surprising for a judge who believed that the "participation
of the Negro in politics is a source of evil and danger.
30
A telling example of political resistance to Brown was a 1956 decla-
ration that came to be known as the Southern Manifesto, drafted and
signed by 19 of 22 southern senators and 77 of 105 House representa-
tives from the states comprising the Old Confederacy?' The mem-
bers of Congress pledged to use "all lawful means to bring about a re-
versal of th [e Brown] decision which is contrary to the Constitution,"32
and declared that the Brown decision constituted "a clear abuse ofju-
dicial power."3 3 In support of the South's post-Brown credo, "as long
as we can legislate, we can segregate," southern and border state leg-
islators enacted 126 new laws and state constitutional amendments
designed to preserve segregation by 1957. 34 South Carolina's "Com-
mittee of 52" acted to enshrine the theory of "interposition" as state
policy, which asserted a state's right to "interpose [its] sovereignty...
between Federal Courts and local school officials. 35  By mid-1957,
southern states rapidly adopted interposition measures. With the
exception of North Carolina, all southern states enacted anti-NAACP
laws.7
Creative and common forms of administrative defiance of Brown
that garnered the state of Virginia recognition as the "showplace for
164-65 ("Parker's fine distinction (a question-begging one) between integration and non-
discrimination or desegregation was a highly restrictive exegesis of Brown.").
29 See, e.g., Boson v. Rippy, 285 F.2d 43, 48 (5th Cir. 1960) (adopting the reasoning in Briggs
and noting that the Sixth Circuit had also relied on Briggs); Jackson v. Sch. Bd., 203 F. Supp.
701, 704-05 (W.D. Va. 1962) (citing the Parker dictum); see also KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 358
("[T]he remedial obligation of school districts was to dismantle state-sponsored segregation,
not to produce racial balance in the schools.").
30 Richard A. Baker, Historical Minute Essays: Judicial Tempest, May 14, 2003, at http://
www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/minute/JudicialTempest.htm.
31 The three refusers included Senator Lyndon Johnson from Texas and both senators from
Tennessee, Albert Gore and Esetes Kefauver. James Patterson notes that all three had presiden-
tial or vice-presidential ambitions that dictated a distancing from southern racist opinion.
PATTERSON, supra note 25, at 98-99.
32 Declaration of Constitutional Principles, 102 CONG. REC. 4515, 4516 (1956).
33 Id. at 4515.
ROSENBERG, supra note 25, at 79.
35 BARTLEY, supra note 25, at 129. Editor James Kilpatrick of the Richmond News Leader has
also been credited with the formulation of "interposition" as theory and tactic. Id.
The states adopting interposition measures included Alabama (April 1956 and April
1957), Arkansas (June and December, 1956), Florida (June 1957), Georgia (April 1956), Lou-
isiana (August 1956), Mississippi (April 1956), South Carolina (April 1956), Tennessee (April
1957), and Virginia (April 1956). BARTLEY, supra note 25, at 131 n.20.
37 See ROSENBERG, supra note 25, at 79, 350 (chronicling laws that ranged from forbidding
NAACP members from holding local or state government jobs, to requiring disclosure of mem-
bership lists, and pursuing nuisance criminal prosecutions of champerty, barratry, and mainte-
nance).
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segregation devices""' included closing schools altogether rather than
deseiregating, 9 cutting off funding for schools under integration or-
ders, and providing tuition grants for white children to attend "pri-
vate," i.e., white schools.4'
Civil coercion in the form of widespread harassment, intimida-
tion, and violence directed at black community efforts to desegregate
represented yet another type of popular southern resistance to42
Brown. As Michael Belknap has chronicled, between 1955 and 1959
in the eleven states of the Old Confederacy, there were 210 incidents
of intimidation (ranging from Klan rallies to cross burnings and
death threats) attributable to the racial polarization that followed
Brown, as well as 225 anti-civil rights acts of violence, including six
murders in which all the victims were black, twenty-nine armed as-
saults, and forty-four beatings. 43 The violence ignited by Brown in the
South was foreseeable, in light of previous reactions to even the mild-
est challenges to the order of white supremacy.44 While some south-
ern officials acted effectively to prevent and contain such violence,
others permitted it and southern criminal justice systems generally
failed to sanction such violence. 45  The federal government's inade-
38 Id. at 79.
39 See WILKINSON, supra note 26, at 82-83 (dividing southern legal resistance to Brown into
two categories, the most extreme of which included school-closing and fund-cutoff laws).
40 See WILHOIT, supra note 25, at 139-40 (outlining four lines of defense against school de-
segregation passed by Virginia's general assembly in its strategy of Massive Resistance); see also
WILKINSON, supra note 26, at 82 (characterizing Virginia's fund-cutoff law as the most dramatic
instance of this southern strategy of legal resistance to desegregation, and noting that funds
withheld from schools attempting integration were distributed as tuition grants for private
school pupils); Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Toward a Pragmatic Understanding of Status-Consciousness:
The Case of Deregulated Education, 50 DUKE L.J. 753, 781 (2000) (describing a Michigan federal
court's refusal to authorize funding for a proposed charter school based on requirements of the
desegregation decree).
41 See PATTERSON, supra note 25, at 99 (describing Virginia's strategy of Massive Resistance,
which included establishment of white private schools rather than desegregation of existing
public schools); see also WILHOIT, supra note 25, at 139-40 (counting state-funding tuition grants
for private school pupils among Virginia's lines of defense to desegregation); Brown-Nagin, su-
pra note 40, at 774 (drawing "parallels between charter schools and school choice programs that
allow students to opt out of conventional attendance zones, and the segregation academies of
the 1950s and 1960s"). The closing of schools post-Brown, instead of desegregating, combined
with the offer of tuition grants for alternative "private" schools, provides a key historical context
for understanding the widespread civil rights community's opposition to the Republican party's
policy on school vouchers that subsidize private schools and effectively undermine quality pub-
lic education. PATTERSON, supra note 25, at 99-100; see a/soJOHN E. CHUBB & TERRY M. MOE,
POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS 11-12, 206 (1990) (describing the political groups
with a vested interest in the closure of schools as well as the popularity of school choice and the
privatization of education).
42 KIARMAN, supra note 11, at 411-13, 421-42.
43 MICHAEL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE POST-BROWN SOUTH 28-29 (1987).
4 Id. at 51-52.
45 Id. at 27, 52.
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quate response, which "showed little inclination to protect [African]
Americans,"46 troubles any characterization of this violence as "pri-
vate."
Much of the violence that occurred during the time of Massive
Resistance was directly related to desegregation efforts.47 Even the
token integration of one African American student was enough to in-
cite violent desegregation riots that resulted in death.48 James Mere-
dith's admission to the University of Mississippi provoked a "desegre-
gation riot" in the fall of 1962 that required 123 deputy federal
marshals, 316 U.S. border guards, and 97 federal prison guards to
protect him.49 After a violent mob of whites opposing Meredith's
admission-armed with guns, bricks, and Molotov cocktails-grew to
2,000, President Kennedy sent 16,000 federal troops to quell the seg-
regationists' uprising.0 The riot left two people dead and 160 in-
jured, including 28 federal marshals who were shot and had been or-
dered not to shoot back and only to use tear gas.51
Autherine Lucy, the first African American graduate student ad-
mitted to the University of Alabama in February of 1956, was greeted
by a mob numbering over a thousand hostile whites "throwing rocks
and eggs and threatening a lynching."52 Following a three-day riot,
the University indefinitely suspended Lucy on "safety grounds" which
was made permanent after she accused university officials of conspir-
ing with the rioters.3 On the first day of Dorothy Count's admission
to the all-white Harding High School in Charlotte, North Carolina in
the fall of 1957, she was met by young whites jeering, spitting, and
throwing pebbles, sticks, and paper balls.54 After one week of such a
reception, she withdrew from Harding for an integrated school in the
Philadelphia suburbs.55
While much of the civil coercion is often reduced to "vigilante vio-
lence" of private groups such as the Ku Klux Klan or White Citizens'
Councils that proliferated after Brown,56 it should be noted that public
officials and the state often incited, contributed to, or permitted such
46 Id. at 27.
47 Id. at 29.
48 KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 433.




52 KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 423.
53 WILHOIT, supra note 25, at 46.
54 WILKINSON, supra note 26, at 87.
55 Id.; see also PATTERSON, supra note 25, at 105-07 (detailing the abuses that Dorothy Counts
and her family endured during her attendance at Harding which led her to enroll in an inte-
grated school).
56 WILHOIT, supra note 25, at 104, 111.
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violence.57 For example, one Mississippi legislator declared that "a
few killings" now could "save a lot of bloodshed later on." s Even offi-
cials seeking to discourage violence often normalized it. "God knows
what the results will be," admonished South Carolina's attorney gen-
eral, when "our patience may become exhausted."' 9 For these rea-
sons, the category of "extra-legal" violence should be approached
with skepticism.
Even after the Massive Resistance era ended in 1959, cultural and
political resistance to Brown thwarted desegregation efforts for dec-
ades. Massive Resistance was replaced by what one scholar has
termed "token compliance" between 1959 and 1964,60 marked by su-
perficial desegregation by localities, such as deploying "pupil-
placement boards6 1 to admit the smallest number of African Ameri-
cans possible into white schools. 62 The passage of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act began the next period, known as "modest integration,"
that effected limited compliance in parts of the rural South and ur-
ban North, leaving most areas in the nation virtually untouched.63
What can we learn from the lesson of the two Brown decisions and
the massive legal, political, administrative, and civil resistance that fol-
lowed? Today, we should soberly acknowledge the success of Massive
Resistance and the subsequent stages of resistance in terms of the
state of desegregation today. Though almost universally praised as a
watershed decision, Brown's promise of desegregating America's
57 See KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 426-42 (articulating the ways in which state and local poli-
ticians directly and indirectly fomented "vigilante violence").
58 Id. at 427.
59 Id.
60 See WILKINSON, supra note 26, at 78, and accompanying text (describing the five stages of
southern school desegregation).
61 KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 330-33.
62 See Holt v. Raleigh City Bd. of Educ., 265 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1959) (requiring adherence to
pupil placement laws); see also Covington v. Edwards, 264 F.2d 780 (4th Cir. 1959) (upholding
pupil placement laws and establishing procedures to be followed);,AELL, supra note 18, at 168
n.12 (identifying sources of general discussion on pupil placement laws and their effects);
KLARMAN, supra note 11, at 358-59 (offering reasons why pupil placement and freedom of
choice became the most popular methods of resisting desegregation); WILKINSON, supra note
26, at 83-86 (describing the effects of pupil placement laws enacted in ten southern states as
enjoying greater popularity, ingenuity, and success than school closing laws).63
Two subsequent periods of resistance to Brown include the "massive integration" stage that
began with Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971), in which the Su-
preme Court ordered busing to desegregate Charlotte's public schools, and the period of reseg-
regation beginning with the Reagan administration in the 1980s that continues today.
WILKINSON, supra note 26, at 78; see also Richard J. Altenbaugh, Liberation and Frustration: Fifty
Years After Brown, 44 HIST. OF EDUC. Q. 1 (Spring 2004) (noting that "modest integration" pro-
duced some progress, but that progress toward desegregation remained nominal in the South
and nearly non-existent in the North), available at http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/
heq/44.1/altenbaugh.html.
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schools has yet to be fulfilled.64 In the eleven states that comprised
the Old Confederacy, only 1.17% of African American students were
attending desegregated schools by the 1963-64 school year.
6 5
Gary Orfield and Chungmei Lee at the Harvard Civil Rights Pro-
ject have demonstrated that, some fifty years after the Brown decision,
we are still at least two nations-if not three or more-in terms of
ongoing, entrenched racial segregation which makes a mockery of
66any claims to meritocracy in college or graduate school admissions.
Today, American schools are resegregating African American and La-
tino students. According to the Harvard Civil Rights Project report,
the nation has been moving "backward toward greater segregation
for Black students" since the high point for desegregation in the late
1980s.67 Segregation for Latinos has been "steadily increasing" since
the first national data was collected in the late 1960s."8 African Ameri-
can and Latino students tend to be segregated in tangibly and
"deeply unequal" high poverty schools.69 Furthermore, most white
students have negligible contact with students of color.70
Professor Klarman argues that Brown's impact was not its legal pro-
nouncement or doctrine, but rather its cultural and political import
in fomenting a new level of southern white opposition to racial
change and equality. According to Klarman, the Court-ordered
school desegregation galvanized the southern resistors and radical-
ized southern politics, leading to the installation of hard-liner politi-
cians who violently suppressed burgeoning civil rights movements
and protests.7 ' Not until the media captured this violent backlash by
the southern states did national opinion on race become transformed
into a "counter-backlash," thereby leading to the passage of key civil
rights laws in Congress in the mid-1960s.72
While I may not completely agree with Professor Klarman's revi-
sionist interpretation of Brown, I fully agree with his insight that "liti-
64 GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, BROWN AT FIFTY: KING'S DREAM OR PLESSY'S NIGHTMARE?
(2004) (examining a decade of resegregation beginning with the Board of Education v. Dowel
498 U.S. 237 (1991), in which the Court authorized a return to neighborhood schools even if
that would create segregation), available at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/
reseg04/brown5O.pdf; see also Brown-Nagin, supra note 40, at 789-90 (citing cases that relieve
school systems from desegregation orders even if they have not fulfilled them).
65 BELL, supra note 18, at 148; see also ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 64, at 17 (noting that ten
years after Brown, ninety-eight percent of southern Black students remained in all-Black
schools).
66 ORFIELD & LEE, supra note 64, at 9.
67 Id. at 4.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id. at 16 (concluding that the average white student goes to a school that is seventy-nine
percent white, while the average Black student attends a school that is thirty-one percent white).
7KARMAN, supra note 11, at 385-442.
7 Id. at 441-42.
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gation without a social movement to support it c [an]not produce sig-
nificant social change."3 Having sketched how my argument is illus-
trated by the history of massive resistance to Brown, I would now turn
to Bakke and what I refer to as the "passive resistance" response to the
opinion.
B. "Passive Resistance" and the Lesson from Bakke:
A "Smirk and a Wink?"
After Brown, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 4 is often
considered the next landmark case in the area of educational equity.
In this fractured decision, no single opinion garnered a majority.-75
Justice Powell and four other justices held that a University of Cali-
fornia at Davis Medical School affirmative action policy setting aside
sixteen out of one hundred slots for disadvantaged and minority ap-
plicants was an impermissible "quota. ",7 However, in an opinion au-
thored by Justice Brennan, four other Justices agreed with Justice
Powell and declared that race could be used in college admissions as
a "plus factor" consistent with the Harvard model of admissions.77
The Brennan four applied a more relaxed level of scrutiny, below
strict scrutiny, and approved of even non-remedial/non-societal dis-
crimination rationales for affirmative action.78
In the last decade, the Bakke case has been hailed by diversity ad-
vocates, especially in litigation, as the hallmark of a just, reasoned de-
cision. Justice Powell has even been referred to as "Solomonic" by
civil rights observers and scholars in terms of how fairly he balanced
the various interests at stake in crafting racial remedies. 79 In the face
of recent challenges to affirmative action in courts and in state initia-
tives, Bakke seems to represent the normative ideal for educational
73 Id. at 381.
74 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
75 Under Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1976), where no single rationale garnered
a majority, the Court determined that "the holding... may be viewed as that position taken by
those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds."
76 Bakke, 438 U.S. at 319-20 (plurality opinion).
77 Id. at 297.
7 In upholding the U.C. Davis policy in Bakke, the "Brennan four" noted that "its purpose is
to overcome the effects of segregation by bringing the races together." Id. at 374 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part); see also Jack Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting
the Condition and Theory, 43 B.C. L. REv. 521, 597-99 (2002) (concluding that Brennan's partial
dissent could be understood to endorse diversity, thus permitting affirmative action programs
even when they are "neither a remedial consideration, nor one that rests on societal discrimina-
tion.").
79 See, e.g., JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 496-98 (1994) (recalling how
Powell's Bakke opinion was praised as "Solomonic" and an act of "judicial statesmanship" at the
time); Roger Parloff, Bakke to the Future, AM. LAW., Feb. 2002, at 122 (referring to Powell's deci-
sion as "Solomonic" and a "pragmatic triumph").
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equality. Addressing this "time-warp" irony, Professor Michael Olivas
wrote in a 1996 editorial, "[w]ho knew in 1978, that we were at the
high point of affirmative action, that its wave had crested, that the
Bakke decision is what we must fight to protect nearly 20 years later?"
80
For the generation of law students born after 1978, it may come as
a surprise that at the time Bakke was decided, it was seen as a crushing
defeat for advocates of affirmative action:
Civil rights activists... foresaw negative consequences for minorities and
disapproved of the ruling. The NAACP called the ruling "a major disap-
pointment." A Black newspaper, the Amsterdam News, headlined the
story, "Bakke. We Lose!" Kenneth Clark, a Black psychologist whose re-
search had been cited in the Brown opinion, wrote, "The effect of the
Bakke decision psychologically, legally, socially, and morally is devastat-
ing." Jesse Jackson likened the decision to the withdrawal of federal
troops from the South after Reconstruction and argued, "Black people
will again be unprotected. .. we must not greet this decision with a con-
spiracy of silence ... we must rebel." And Stephen Carter, in his 1991 es-
say on affirmative action, recalls that African-American student protesters
at Yale wore buttons reading "Fight Racism, Overturn Bakke."
8
More than 10,000 people marched before the Supreme Court prior
to oral arguments in Bakke to express support for U.C. Davis's Medi-
cal School affirmative action plan.8 2  These supporters, and many
others nationwide, were devastated by the Bakke opinion; this is ironic
today because diversity advocates now enshrine Bakke as a baseline
example of racial justice jurisprudence.""
Despite the deep sense of loss felt by most affirmative action sup-
porters at the time of the decision, some advocates soon discovered a
silver lining to the Bakke decision. A Mexican American Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund representative pointed out that the leg-
acy of Bakke's individual victory may be much more symbolic than sys-
temic, and that most affirmative action programs would survive under
80 Michael A. Olivas, The Decision is Flatly, Unequivocally Wrong, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., March
29, 1996, at 33 (arguing that the decision in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996),
which states that the contemplation of race and ethnicity to achieve diversity in admissions is
not a compelling interest, is erroneous).
81 See WELCH & GRUHL, supra note 79 at 29-30 (1998) (citations omitted) (describing civil
rights activists' response to Bakke).
82 See Lawrence Feinberg, Demonstration on Bakke Suit, WASH. POST, April 16, 1978, at C1, C6
(describing hundreds of demonstrators protesting the Bakke case in Washington, D.C.). The
U.S. Capitol Police estimated the crowd at 10,000, the U.S. Park Police estimated it at 15,000,
while the march organizers estimated it at 50,000 attendees. See alsoJOEL DREYFUSS & CHARLES
LAWRENCE III, THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 204 (1979) ("Student groups had
organized "Anti-Bakke" demonstrations all over the country, including a march by some 10,000
people past the Supreme Court building.").
83 See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 78, at 614 (maintaining that "Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke is a sound justification of affirmative action in higher education").
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the legal standard set forth by Justice Powell. sa The Congressional
Black Caucus similarly advocated that, because the Court upheld the
use of race as a legitimate factor in admissions decisions, this aspect
of the opinion be emphasized to support affirmative action programs
and policies.8 5
For the most part, the silver-lining advocates were correct in sug-
gesting that the legal pronouncement in Bakke--"race-yes, quotas-
no"-would have little impact on existing affirmative action pro-
grams. In their 1997 book, Affirmative Action and Minority Enrollments
in Medical and Law Schools, political scientists Susan Welch and John
Gruhl conclude that Bakke's effect on minority enrollment was far less• 86
than either supporters or opponents predicted. Its impact was
"minimal in affecting the number of minority applicants or enrol-
lees., 8 7 Gruhl and Welch found that, in surveying medical and law
school admissions officers about the perceived impact of the Bakke
case upon their admissions policies, over three-quarters of medical
school officials and sixty-three percent of law school officials claimed
it affected their policies "not at all"8 and "only a minority of schools
reported that Bakke changed rather than reaffirmed their admissions
policies." 9 Instead, the authors identify the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the growing affluence in the African American community, and the
large increase of college educated students of color in the 1980s and
1990s, as well as the dramatic growth of higher education generally,
as more determinative factors that affect diversity applications and
enrollments.
Given the above, what can we learn from the cultural response to
the Bakke case? My own analysis of this post-Bakke, pre-Hopwood v.
Texa' period of admissions is that affirmative action opponents, dis-
pirited and demoralized by the Bakke ruling, eventually embraced the
"silver lining" to the Bakke decision in the "race plus" language, and
worked behind the scenes with college administrators and officials to
mount what I refer to as a sort of "passive resistance" to the decision.
On the one hand, it was clear that quotas were forbidden by Bakke.
However, few schools maintained set-aside quotas that reserved a
84 See WELCH & GRUHL, supra note 79, at 30 (describing the response of civil rights groups to
the Bakke decision).
85 Id.
86 Id. at 133 (discussing the "chilling effect" on minority enrollments that many commenta-
tors predicted in die wake of the Bakke decision).
87 Id. at 134-35.
88 Id. at 74.
89 Id. at 75.
90 Id. at 141-44.
91 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (striking down the use of race as a factor in law school admis-
sions under the Equal Protection Clause, finding that encouraging diversity was not a compel-
ling state interest), overruled by Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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fixed number of seats for affirmative action admits. So most admis-
sions officials could assert that they were in compliance with Bakke.
92
When the Bakke decision was handed down, the president of the As-
sociation of Medical Colleges issued a news release declaring that
"since most of the medical schools are using admissions procedures
which we feel fall within the views of the [C]ourt, we see little effect
of the [C]ourt's ruling on the schools' affirmative action programs.
93
A reporter assessing the prevalence of quotas at the time of the Bakke
decision concluded that "quotas have all but disappeared" between
the filing of Alan Bakke's suit and the Supreme Court's ruling, esti-
mating that "not more than a dozen" institutions still used the set-
aside quotas struck down in Bakke.
94
On the other hand, while set-aside quotas and "two-track" dual
admissions committees were clearly impermissible under Bakke, it was
unclear exactly what was permissible. To interpret the ambiguity of
Powell's "race-plus" formulation, university lawyers, civil rights advo-
cates, and admissions officers participated in numerous seminars,
conferences, and symposia dissecting the Bakke case and its meaning
for higher education. One widespread report sponsored by the
American Council on Education and the Association of American
Law Schools concluded that "the Supreme Court has recognized the
authority of institutions of higher education to continue under cer-
tain circumstances their affirmative action programs" and empha-
sized Justice Powell's idealization of the "Harvard Plan. ' 95
At the same time, experts noted how the distinction between the
Harvard plan and the U.C. Davis plan "was easier to state than to ap-
ply."96 One commentator candidly noted that the distinction was
"nothing more than a smirk and a wink."97 Even Justice Powell's for-
mer clerk and biographer John Jeffries dismissed the Harvard-U.C.
Davis goals-quotas distinction as "pure sophistry,"98 understanding
that Powell's vaunted Harvard plan was simply a more "genteel way"..
of accomplishing the same results as the U.C. Davis plan. In other
words, Harvard's plan afforded race a central role in its admissions
decisions, but was less transparent (and accountable) than U.C.
92 See WELCH & GRUHL, supra note 79, at 70-71 (concluding that only seven percent of
medical students and five percent of law students believed their schools had a quota for minor-
ity admissions).
93 Id. at 66.
94 Id. at 71.
95 Id. at 62.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 63.
98 SeeJEFFRIES, supra note 79, at 484.
Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1854,
1875 (1995).
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Davis's plan. In this sense, Powell penalized U.C. Davis's candor. Or
as Professor Jeffries acknowledged, "[s]tripped of legalisms, the mes-
sage amounted to this: 'You can do whatever you like in preferring
racial minorities, so long as you do not say so. " °
This seeming hypocrisy may have left university admissions offi-
cers with a degree of cynicism, as well as wide latitude to chart a di-
versity course. Some schools even enacted admissions policies akin to
U.C. Davis's stricken plan that did not consider all applicants against
one another individually, but instead had different committees and
policies to assess white and minority applicants. 1 Perhaps they did so
out of confusion, cynicism, or the widespread belief that courts would
allow "extremely broad discretion" in their implementation of "race
as a positive factor" admissions. 2 One law school dean conjectured
that Powell's imprecision on the goals-quotas distinction may have
been purposeful, in order to allow institutions discretion.1
3
While I take no issue with the "resistance" portion of this strategy
(which is morally distinct from massive resistance as I will describe be-
low), I do take issue with the "passive" part, which I believe laid the
foundation for the rise of right-wing organizations and campaigns to
reclaim the moral high ground.1' What I mean specifically is that in-
stead of mounting a more public cultural campaign to contest the
portions of the Bakke opinion that are problematic and unwork-
able, 10 5 affirmative action advocates instead mounted a quiet, behind-
the-scenes resistance to the parts of the decision they did not like,
with ample room to maneuver given the vagueness of the opinion
and the high degree of discretion vested to admissions officers ;i la
Harvard plan.
0 6
Granted, much of the "smirk and wink" approach to administra-
tive passive resistance was a judicial "set-up" of sorts that inhered in
the hypocrisy of elevating the formalism of the Harvard plan over the
100 SeeJEFFRIES, supra note 79, at 484.
101 Gabriel Chin, Bakke to the Wall: The Crisis of Bakkean Diversity, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
881, 938 (1996) ("In 1992, the . . . [University of Texas] [L]aw [S]chool had one admissions
committee for African-Americans and Mexican-Americans and a separate committee for Native
Americans, Asian-Americans, non-Mexican-American Latinos and Latinas, and whites.").
102 See WELCH & GRUHL, supra note 79, at 63.
103 Id. ("The courts have a long history of deferring to the judgments of an administrative
officer so long as [it] ... is within the range of discretion vested in his or her office.").
104 See, e.g., The Center for Individual Rights ("CIR"), Hopwood Ends Affirmative Action in 5th
Circuit ("CIR's landmark 1996 victory against the University of Texas School of Law was the first
successful legal challenge to racial preferences in student admissions since Bakke."), at
http://www.cir-usa.org/cases/hopwood.html (last visitedJan. 27, 2005).
105 See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 324 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting in
part).
106 WELCH & GRUHL, supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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• 107
efficiency and transparency of the U.C. Davis plan. But affirmative
action proponents should have openly criticized, rather than simply
operationalized, Bakke's dysfunction. If diversity may be considered a
legitimate, compelling state interest, then it should be quantifiable.
Universities should be able to state forthrightly what bottom-line
"critical mass" is considered, at minimum, to be necessary. As Jeffries
analogized, if state legislators can freely calibrate the percentage of
in-state students they want at a state-funded university or school, then
why could university officials not openly determine their goals for
minority enrollments? 8
The problem with passive resistance is that, while it preserved en-
rollments and did not jeopardize outright legal prohibition of race-
based affirmative action, the Right discovered a way to repackage and
rearticulate backlash as moral indignation, affirmative action as dis-
crimination, and whites (and now Asians) as victims and Blacks as
perpetrators.'09 One critical way they were able to reclaim the moral
high ground was by unearthing and bringing to light the actual poli-
cies used by admissions officers that had successfully diversified some
of the most elite and multicultural colleges, universities, and graduate
schools in the nation."0 Because these policies had existed on the
"down-low" in the era of passive resistance, and because there had
been no vigorous public debate or campaign contesting Bakke's pro-
hibitions, many of these policies appeared to the public to be unfair
and illegitimate in their furtiveness.
As civil rights advocates had accepted the whittling down of af-
firmative action legal precedents in the hopes of hanging onto what-
ever portions that remained, affirmative action advocates were ill-
prepared to counter the Right's audacious rearticulations of civil
rights and claims of injustice on behalf of white applicants-the Jen-
1123nifer Gratzes,"' Barbara Grutters,"' and Katuria Smiths"3 of the
107 Justice Powell was well aware of the hypocrisy critique, which he addressed in his opinion:
It has been suggested that an admissions program which considers race only as one fac-
tor is simply a subtle and more sophisticated-but no less effective-means of according
racial preference than the Davis program. A facial intent to discriminate, however, is
evident in [Davis's] preference program and not denied in this case. No such facial in-
firmity exists in an admissions program where race or ethnic background is simply one
element-to be weighed fairly against other elements-in the selection process.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318 (plurality opinion).
108 JEFFRIES, supra note 79, at 476.
098 See, e.g., Press Release, CIR, Federal Appeals Court Hears Key Affirmative Action Chal-
lenge (Dec. 6, 2001) (describing how minorities are "evaluated under lower admissions stan-
dards, regardless of whether they suffer from any demonstrable disadvantage," and how univer-
sities "defen [d] the resulting discrimination against white and Asian applicants as necessary to
attain a diverse student body."), available at http://www.cir-usa.org/releases/26.html.
110 Id. (listing CIR's challenges to the use of race in admissions decisions at various schools).
I Jennifer Gratz was the white female plaintiff in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
112 Barbara Grutter was the white female plaintiff in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
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world. Countering them effectively would mean revisiting debates
that had been tried, but lost in litigation (i.e., societal versus indi-
vidualized findings of discrimination, 14 invidious versus benign dis-
tinctions," 5 and compensatory versus diversity rationales 6). Up until
the filing of the University of Michigan cases, most affirmative action
advocates were still playing to the courts of law, rather than to the
courts of public opinion.
II. A CALL FOR RIGHTEOUS RESISTANCE
IN RESPONSE TO GRATZAND GRUTTER
A. The Center for Individual Rights' 2003
"Hearts and Minds" Campaign
The historical analysis of the culture wars from Brown to Bakke
should make clear that, especially in the matter of the Court's school
desegregation and affirmative action cases, the cases matter far less as
law than as culture. The primacy of culture to litigation and social
change is not lost on the opponents of affirmative action. Indeed,
the Center for Individual Rights ("CIR"), which provided the litiga-
tion support for many of the high-profile white plaintiffs challenging
affirmative action plans, knows full well the need for its own "hearts
and minds" campaign to make culturally acceptable a retreat from
racial justice.
In the 1960s Vietnam era, President Lyndon B. Johnson acknowl-
edged that prevailing against Communism in Southeast Asia for the
long-term required more than sheer military force: "The ultimate vic-
tory will depend upon the hearts and minds of the people who actu-
11 Katuria Smith was the white female plaintiff in Smith v. University of Washington Law Schoo4
233 F.3d 1188, 1201 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he Fourteenth Amendment permits University admis-
sions programs which consider race for other than remedial purposes, and educational diversity
is a compelling governmental interest that meets the demands of strict scrutiny of race-
conscious measures.").
114 See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995) (holding that fed-
eral racial classifications must serve a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored
to meet that interest); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (holding that school
district boundaries may be set aside if it can be shown that there has been a constitutional viola-
tion via racially discriminatory acts on behalf of the school board and that this has been a sub-
stantial cause of interdistrict segregation).
115 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 228 (countering the dissent's differentiation between "invidious" and
"benign" discrimination); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 (1978) (stating
that the "benign" discriminatory purpose of helping others still leads to a perception of invidi-
ous discrimination by those denied equal protection).
11 Adarand, 515 U.S. at 221-22 (discussing the Court's difficulty in coming to a consensus on
the level of scrutiny required for a "remedial" or "compensatory" racial classification); Bakke,
438 U.S. at 358 ("[The] recitation of a benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic
shield.").
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ally live out there." 7 In this sense, the war had two fronts-one, the
actual "ground war" or active military combat; the other a propa-
ganda war desi ned to win over Vietnamese citizens to rally against
the Viet Cong.
In the affirmative action culture wars, there is another battle for
the "hearts and minds" of a generation, and that is the current gen-
eration. Make no mistake that this cultural campaign is the primary
aim of CIR, the Pacific Legal Foundation ("PLF"), and similar or-
ganizations that appear to be legal organizations.Y1 9 These organiza-
tions use high-profile litigation as one front, in tandem with a coor-
dinated media and cultural campaign as the second front, designed
to undo civil rights protections gained over the past half century.
In his book, The Assault on Diversity: An Organized Challenge to
Racial and Gender Justice, author Lee Cokorinos quotes CIR attorney
and strategist Michael Rosman as saying that the battle against af-
firmative action cannot be won "if... the [PLF] and [CIR] and the
Fifth Circuit are out there on their own." 2  Rosman explains that
"[o]ne of the primary functions of a lawsuit is public education,",
2 1
and "[1] awsuits without the political will to enforce the results will of-
ten end up only changing the form of race conscious decision-
making ... making them less conspicuous. ' 22 What Michael Rosman,
CIR, PLF, American Civil Rights Coalition, 23 Independent Women's
117 HEARTS AND MINDS (Touchstone Pictures 1974).
18 Id. Later, the documentary, "Hearts and Minds" rendered the slogan as satire by captur-
ing on film the ways in which the U.S. military was decidedly not in Southeast Asia for such al-
truistic reasons, especially from the vantage point of Southeast Asians. Id.
19 See Terry Carter, On a Roll(back), A.B.A.J., Feb. 1998, at 54 (discussing the Center for Indi-
vidual Rights' win in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), and its plan to file five more
suits against universities); see also Pacific Legal Foundation ("PLF"), About Us ("PLF is re-
nowned for battling those who would tread on individual liberty ... for opposing government
programs that grant special preferences on the basis of race and sex .... "), at http://
www.pacificlegal.org/PLFProfile.asp (last visited Dec. 5, 2004).
120 LEE COKORINOS, THE ASSAULT ON DIVERSITY: AN ORGANIZED CHALLENGE TO RACIAL AND
GENDERJUSTICE 127-28 (2003).
121 Id. at 128.
1I2 Id. Rosman further elaborates on the role of political leadership to this culture war pos-
ing as legal battle:
To ultimately eliminate race conscious decision-making what we need are political lead-
ers who are willing to harness the dissatisfaction in this country over preferences and
turn it into action. And it will take political courage to do so, because the political mi-
nority, as I've said before, has a strong intensity of preference on this issue.
Id.
123 The American Civil Rights Coalition ("ACRC") is a national organization created by Ward
Connerly in the wake of California's Proposition 209 anti-affirmative action campaign to ban
affirmative action across the country. ACRC is supported by the extensive financial networks of
the Right. COKORINOS, supra note 120, at 32.
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Forum, 124 Center for New Black Leadership, 125 and other conservative
think tanks and strategists understand is that only by convincing the
current generation of students that affirmative action is a violation of
civil rights, and a racial remedy run amok, can they successfully pre-
vail in realizing their right-wing agenda.
Affirmative action proponents must give them their due. Conser-
vatives have been amazingly productive and successful given their
numbers and the normative claim they have been undertaking. They
are trying to render as positive, a retreat from full inclusion and a re-
turn to segregation of higher education. Their strategies have
worked with a good segment of the American population, including
many among the current generation, and not limited to young
whites. Through their litigation narratives, they have been reaching
out to the public on a campaign to make exclusion morally upright
by transposing whites, almost always white women, as the victims of
undeserving African American sinecurists.
12
6
The progressive community must reject these cynical attempts and
reclaim the moral high ground. We must expose the broad appeal of
the attempt to re-enshrine whiteness as victimhood, thereby restoring
whiteness to its full pre-civil rights, Jim Crow value.
27
B. Why Righteous Resistance is Distinct from Massive Resistance
Affirmative action opponents have already been characterizing
university responses to Proposition 209 and Hopwood v. Texas 12 as new
forms of "Massive Resistance," ironically saving moral approbrium
that escaped segregationists for those currently seeking to maintain a
modicum of integration in higher education. The consistency ques-
tion may legitimately be raised: how can one promote resistance to
the current law (of affirmative action) while, at the same time, cri-
124 The Independent Women's Forum was formed by loosely-affiliated conservative women to
promote Clarence Thomas's nomination to the Supreme Court and has established itself as the
"the premier antifeminist women's group in Washington." COKORINOS, supra note 120, at 56.
125 The mission of the Center for New Black Leadership is to "promote a new vision of lead-
ership on public policy questions having a racial dimension." Id.
126 See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 373 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (discussing the adverse effect of
people feeling cheated by the government's use of race with respect to affirmative action);
Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that Caucasians'
claims for injunctive and declaratory relief regarding the University of Washington Law
School's use of race as a consideration in its admissions policy were moot).
127 See Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARv. L. REv. 1707 (1993) (discussing the
interrelation of racial identity and property with regard to American law); see also Sumi Cho,
Redeeming Whiteness in the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemp-
tion, 40 B.C. L. REV. 73 (1998) (discussing a "racial redemption" theory, an ideological and psy-
cho-social process, by which whiteness maintains its reputational existence).
128 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the contemplation of race and ethnicity to
achieve diversity in admissions is not a compelling interest).
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tique resistance to prior law (of desegregation)? Is the moral force of
a call for righteous resistance not undermined by this inconsistency
and hypocrisy?
My answer to this charge is that as a society, we should be able to
assess the moral claims of those seeking to promote white supremacy
and racial exclusion from the moral claims of those seeking to pro-
mote affirmative action and racial inclusion. What distinguishes Mas-
sive Resistance from Righteous Resistance is the moral decrepitude of
the former. And if Professor Klarman is correct, then the cultural re-
sistance to the "rule of law" is not so much undermining the law as it
is informing the law. In other words, law and culture are mutually
constitutive. I am simply arguing for a culture of resistance to white
supremacy and white normativity to inform the judicial decision-
making on affirmative action that will "find" the law in the next
twenty-five years and thereafter.
C. Why Righteous Resistance is Preferable to Passive Resistance
Although we "won" Grutter legally-speaking, insofar as the Univer-
sity of Michigan Law School affirmative action program was upheld, I
still advocate for a "righteous resistance" response to the University of
Michigan cases in light of understanding affirmative action jurispru-
dence as a larger "culture war." Seen this way, Grutter, while a legal
"win," is consistent with the long line of Supreme Court cases since
Bakke attempting to "wean" the public off of racial remedies, and af-
firmative action in particular. An outright prohibition on the use of
"diversity" as a compelling state interest likely would have provoked
outright resistance not only from diversity activists, but also from the
Fortune 500 corporate elite, and the military elite which weighed in
favor of Michigan's admissions policies in their respective amicus cu-
riae briefs.129  Such a ruling would not have served the interests of
maintaining racial hegemony through law. Prohibiting the use of
race in affirmative action would have been read widely among diver-
sity proponents as serving white interests.
Instead, the Court upheld only one of the Michigan admissions
policies, using a multinational, multicultural capitalism-global po-
liceman rationale," ° and limiting even that interest-convergence ap-
proach to racial remedy to a twenty-five-year window."' It should be
noted that the divided Grutter Court was unanimous in the following
129 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31 (discussing the benefits of affirmative action as evidenced by
the various briefs filed with the Court).
13 Id. at 308 ("[T] he skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be de-
veloped through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.").
131 Id. at 391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (discussing the Law School's burden of proving that
race was not used in an unconstitutional way).
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regard: all members of the Court disparaged the goal of seeking ra-
cial balance as unconstitutional."2 All nine Justices agreed that re-
quiring proportions for racial balancing is unconstitutional. The five-
Justice majority referred to "racial balancing" as "patently unconstitu-
tional" 3 3 and found the University of Michigan Law School admis-
sions program to be a vague and permissible search for a "critical
mass" of diverse students that was individualized and not a propor-
tional system.13 4 The O'Connor majority made clear that one of the
reasons for the opinion's twenty-five-year "sunset" provision is for the
very purpose of prohibiting affirmative action from fulfilling the goal
of racial balance. In emphasizing the need for a termination point
for race-conscious admissions, the majority cites as authority a quote
from a 1977 legal newspaper article entitled The Constitutionality of
Preferential Treatment for Minority Applicants to Professional Schools, which
stated that " [i] t would be a sad day indeed, were America to become
a quota-ridden society, with each identifiable minority assigned pro-
portional representation in every desirable walk of life.'
3 5
The four dissenting Justices found the Michigan Law School's
admissions plan and "critical mass" approach to be "precisely the type
of racial balancing that the Court itself calls 'patently unconstitu-
tional." 3 6 The Rehnquist dissent also laments that, " [s] tripped of its
'critical mass' veil, the Law School's program is revealed as a naked
effort to achieve racial balancing. In a separate dissent, Justice
Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, similarly remarked that "It]he ad-
missions statistics show it to be a sham to cover a scheme of racially
proportionate admissions.'
38
While diversity advocates should take the limited "win" and con-
vert whatever cultural capital it conveys, we must also understand that
in order to make the legal win "real," we must maintain vigilance and
state more forthrightly and publicly why the quest for racial justice
and equality is just beginning. In other words, we must make clear
that America is at the sunrise of racial equality, not the sunset. We
must undertake a well-crafted political, legal, and cultural campaign
on the issues of affirmative action and racial equality and social jus-
tice generally if we hope to maintain Grutter in the "win" column as
opposed to having Grutter serve as the legal "landbridge" from Jim
Crow to the end of affirmative action and racial remedies.
13 For a general discussion of this argument, see Spann, supra note 7, at 641-46.
1 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (plurality opinion).
4 Id. at 335 (finding that the admissions program did not act as a quota).
1 Id. at 343 (citing Nathanson & Bartnik, The Constitutionality of Preferential Treatment for Mi-
nority Applicants to Professional Schools, 58 CHI. BAR. ASS'N. REC. 282, 293 (1977)).
1 Id. at 386 (RehnquistJ., dissenting).
137 Id. at 379.
m Id. at 346-47 (Scalia,J., dissenting in part).
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In this regard, I argue that affirmative action proponents must not
allow what is perceived to be a legal victory to lull ourselves yet again
into a "Bakkean" state of complacency. We must reject the strategy of
massive resistance to Brown and its moral decrepitude of defending
white supremacy, as well as the morally vulnerable and ineffective-in-
the-long-run passive resistance to Bakke that has embraced adminis-
trative activism, as a substitute for political activism and cultural con-
testation.
III. WHERE Do WE GO FROM HERE?
Although affirmative action advocates can claim a partial win in
Grutter, that win will be preserved and hopefully expanded only with
the hard work to provide society with a more compelling vision of ra-
cial and social justice than the other side's rearticulation. If one takes
seriously my call for righteous resistance, what would a proactive ap-
proach to Grutter be like? How would a righteous resistance move-
ment accomplish this? I have only a few suggestions to share today,
but call upon all diversity advocates to make this our positive mission
in the wake of Grutter.
A. Resisting Internalization of the Law and Understanding Its Limits
(or Understanding Law as Culture)
Historically, academics seeking to justify Jim Crow segregation
coined the phrase "[s] tateways cannot change folkways" to rationalize
the Court's retreat from the Fourteenth Amendment and failure to
apply the Equal Protection Clause in the post-Reconstruction era.
We can revive the core insight absent the moral decrepitude by
adopting a Foucauldian understanding of power as diffuse, and not
simply disseminated from top-down (state-citizenry), and use that
understanding to our advantage. In short, the power is everywhere.
In other words, let us not be too cowed as lawyers, law professors, and
law students, by the law!
On a related point, we must broaden the discussion beyond what
have been the legally acceptable and respectable terms of the de-
bate. 9 We cannot abandon the salience of "societal" discrimination
merely because the Court has deemed most forms of institutionalized
racism to exist beyond the reach of racial remedies. We must revisit
Bakke's dissent. We need a discussion of not only the broader social
conditions that make affirmative action necessary, but a broader dis-
cussion of how we need to act as a society to "do right" by those who
have been historically and contemporarily mistreated. On affirmative
139 See Greenberg, supra note 78, at 521 for further discussion on these approaches.
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action, we need to ask whether we are comfortable as a society where
predominantly whites and Asians have access to the most prestigious
institutions of higher learning. If not, what is the solution for the in-
ability of existing meritocratic standards to deliver diverse classes?
B. Pursuing Racial Balance Unapologetically
On a substantive basis, we must embrace and advocate for the goal
of racial balance and power-sharing in the country's most important
educational institutions and employment opportunities. Perhaps we
are too vested in our own professionalism and struggle as outsiders
for respectability to comprehend fully what it would mean to step
outside of the norms of affirmative action constitutional jurispru-
dence. When I say we, I include myself, lawyers generally, and the
Critical Race Theory community as well. Let me illustrate this point
more concretely: Who is willing to go on the record in favor of "quo-
tas"? Understandably, very few people, if any. But we must acknowl-
edge that the "no man's land" of what is called "quotas" has been le-
gally and culturally constructed. We need look no further than post-
apartheid South Africa to understand this cultural construction of the
"patent unconstitutionality" of the goal of racial balance. In that
country, which has struggled with the legacy of white supremacy and
the continuing underrepresentation of people of color in the best
schools and jobs, the goal of racial balance is not only permitted, but
also required.1'4
We should remember that what was legally discredited in Bakke as
a quota at the U.C. Davis Medical School was an affirmative action
program based on race and class that "set aside" sixteen slots out of
100 at this highly competitive school for persons from underprivi-
leged and underrepresented groups who wanted to serve underprivi-
leged and underrepresented communities. Thus, had Powell "gone
the other way" in upholding the U.C. Davis policy, diversity advocates
would not only be in support of the Davis "quota" policy today, we
probably would not refer to it as a "quota," but merely as affirmative
action. The real irony post-Bakke is that under the era of passive resis-
tance, administrators and activists were able to achieve gains far ex-
ceeding sixteen percent of affirmative action slots for students of
140 See Carmen Morris Twyman, Note, Finding Justice in South African Labor Law: The Use of Ar-
bitration to Evaluate Affirmative Action, 33 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 307, 311 (2001) ("The Em-
ployment Equity Act is a clear attempt by the South African government to use law to steer so-
cial and economic life towards the values of racial equality."). For a related argument in the
U.S. context, see Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action as Equalizing Opportu-
nity: Challenging the Myth of Preferential Treatment, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE: AN ANTHOLOGY 451
(Hugh LaFollette ed., 1st ed. 1997), and LUKE CHARLES HARRIS, THE MEANING OF EQuAUTY IN
POST-APARTHEID AMERICA (forthcoming 2005).
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color, and this was absent consideration of class status and desire to
practice in underserved communities (two competing reforms often
disingenuously proposed to undermine current race-based affirma-
tive action policies).
C. Talking to Each Other and to Our Natural Base of Supporters
Instead of Primarily to the Courts and to Our Opponents
Perhaps the cold war analogy applies here: the Soviet Union was
so busy fighting the external threat of the arms race with the United
States that it lost its ability to provide the fundamentals of govern-
ment-economic stability for its citizens. In this sense, Reagan's cold
war strategy may have been successful in diverting Soviet attention
from its fundamental base in a similar way that CIR has been divert-
ing diversity advocates' attention from their fundamental base. We
cannot take the current generation for granted. We have not passed
down basic information to our own communities' youth and young
adults, perhaps because we have been so busy fighting the Right. But
we cannot expect busloads of students to come to Washington, D.C.
for a Grutter march when they are constantly having to respond or
dodge fellow students who question their right to be in law school.
We have to take time to discuss the history and what is at stake and
the arguments and strategies deployed. We must hear and respond
to concerns. It is an organic process that requires more interaction
between progressive students and faculty or other "experienced"
people in a coordinated fashion. The civil rights movement came
about in this way. This new orientation of focus should not be con-
strued as merely "preaching to the converted," but providing ammu-
nition to the converted.
D. Adopting an Interracial, Intergroup Justice Approach
We must resist the narrowing of affirmative action via the "narrow
tailoring" requirement to binary white-over-Black discussions of race.
We must discuss why affirmative action's beneficiaries generally
(though perhaps not always specifically) must be multiracial given the
multiple injuries imposed by white supremacy. We must strengthen
ties among communities of color through our advocacy work on af-
firmative action.
The defense of affirmative action and broader vision of racial jus-
tice must be linked to other forms of social justice, whether it is to gay
marriage or to critiques of racial profiling under the USA PATRIOT
Feb. 2005]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITU-TIONAL LA W
Act14' and national security regime. It is not a coincidence, for exam-
ple, that the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001142 includes provisions
that allow military recruiters to have access to student lists at under-
performing schools, 43 and thereby conveniently prepare them for an
easy transition into the military.
We should note that the other side clearly draws the conceptual
links between various backlash objectives to create a powerful right-
wing agenda. For example, Ann Coulter of the Independent
Women's Forum, a right-wing organization posing as a feminist think
tank, handily made the connection between affirmative action and
national security in her editorial, Affirmative Action for Osama, decrying
the affirmative action program in Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peia
that would permit the 12,000 boys in Pakistan named "Osama" to be
"granted preferential treatment over American-born whites.', 45
While developing a multi-issue, intergroup justice approach to ra-
cial justice and support of affirmative action, we cannot be afraid to
address the controversial issues that arise in the forging of multi-issue
coalitions. We must acknowledge the gap between what we would
like to believe and what is really true. We cannot afford to retreat
into slogans or dogmas, no matter how reassuring they may be. We
must continue to search for answers and ask the hard questions, such
as why not even a simple majority of white women support affirmative
action. 46 We need to interrogate, and white women need to interro-
gate, the ways in which the racialization of the family and entrenched
patterns of segregation may dictate even feminist perspectives on af-
firmative action.
CONCLUSION
Twenty-five years from now, where will we be? We have only be-
gun to realize Brown f's promise of equality, and we have only begun
to administer in earnest, if rather messily, the challenge of equality
since Bakke. It is my hope that affirmative action advocates will not
become complacent with Grutter, but will commit to undertaking a
141 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.
272 (codified in scattered sections of U.S.C.).
142 Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
143 Pub. L. No. 107-110, § 901, 115 Stat. 1983 (2001) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 7908 (a)(3))
14 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (holding that federal racial classifications must serve a compelling
governmental interest and be narrowly tailored to meet that interest).
145 Ann Coulter, Editorial, Affirmative Action for Osama, Oct. 11, 2001, available at http://
frontpagemag.com/articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=109.
See Sumi Cho, Understanding White Women's Ambivalence Towards Affirmative Action: Theoriz-
ing Political Accountability in Coalitions, 71 UMKC L. REV. 399 (2002) (discussing possible reasons
for why white women oppose affirmative action).
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cultural campaign necessary to redefine a broader meaning of equal-
ity that goes beyond "Bakkean" compromises and Grutter's ("multicul-
tural elite") interest convergences. Otherwise, our dreams for a bet-
ter society may be "eclipsed" by the Court's termination of racial
remedies while we are still at the sunrise of racial equality.
